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Abstract 
South Africa has undergone significant trade liberalization since the end of apartheid. 
Average protection has fallen while openness has increased. However, economic growth 
has been insufficient to make inroads into the high unemployment levels. Poverty levels 
have also risen. The country’s experience presents an interesting challenge for many 
economists that argue that trade liberalization is pro-poor and pro-growth. This study 
investigates the short and long term effects of trade liberalization using a dynamic 
microsimulation computable general equilibrium approach. Trade liberalization has been 
simulated by a complete removal of all tariffs on imported goods and services, and by a 
combination of tariff removal and an increase of total factor productivity. The main findings 
are that a complete tariff removal on imports has negative welfare and poverty reduction 
impacts in the short run which turns positive in the long term due to the accumulation effects. 
When the tariff removal simulation is combined with an increase of total factor productivity, 
the short and long run effects are both positive in terms of welfare and poverty reduction. 
The mining sector (highest export orientation) is the biggest winner from the reforms while 
the textiles sector (highest initial tariff rate) is the biggest loser. African and Colored 
households gain the most in terms of welfare and numbers being pulled out of absolute 
poverty by trade liberalization.  
JEL Classification: D58, E27, F17, I32, O15, O55 
Keywords: Sequential dynamic CGE, microsimulation, trade liberalization, total factor 
productivity, poverty, welfare, growth, South Africa 3 
1. Introduction 
South Africa has made significant strides towards trade liberalization since its 
readmission to the international community after successful free elections in April 1994. This 
followed years of international isolation imposed on the country due to its racially motivated 
apartheid policies. Trade liberalization has been accompanied by responsible monetary and 
fiscal management. The economic performance of the post apartheid economy has been 
quite strong, averaging growth in real gross domestic product (GDP) of 3.3 percent and 1.35 
percent in per capita terms for the period 1995 to 2005. This growth trend was an 
improvement, if one compares with the rates of the 1985 to 1994 period, where the 
respective average rates were 0.8 and –1.3 percent. The improved growth performance is 
largely attributable to strong domestic demand and a large foreign capital inflow in the face 
of low inflation and interest rates. Although disputed, many authors argue that poverty has 
been increasing (Hoogeveen and Özler 2004)
2. Less disputed is the well known fact that 
South Africa has income inequality that is amongst the highest in the world. At the same 
time, there was an increase in unemployment as a result of insufficient economic growth and 
the growing cost of labor relative to capital. Thus, despite carrying out deep and sustained 
trade liberalization, the economy has failed to grow in sufficient amounts to make inroads 
into high unemployment, inequality and poverty. 
The experience of South Africa presents an interesting puzzle for those who argue 
that trade liberalization reduces poverty and increases economic growth. This study 
investigates the short and long term effects of trade liberalization in South Africa using a 
dynamic microsimulation computable general equilibrium (CGE) approach. In this approach, 
the endogenous changes obtained from the sequential dynamic CGE model are fed into 
national survey data for predicted household poverty effects. Trade liberalisation is simulated 
by a complete removal of all tariffs on imported goods and services, and by a combination of 
tariff removal and an increase of the total factor productivity. Similarities can be drawn 
between this work and that of Annabi et al. (2005 a,b)
3.  
While South Africa has gone a long way in reducing tariffs, further liberalisation is still 
conceivable because a number of commodities including processed foods, vehicles and 
components, tobacco products, rubber products and textiles and garments still receive 
substantial protection. In principle, therefore, there is scope to check whether further trade 
liberalisation does indeed lead to an acceleration of growth and productivity through greater 
allocative efficiency and better resource allocation as well as through factor accumulation 
effects. 
The rest of the paper is organised in the following way: Section 2 presents country  
  4
background focusing on key trade and macroeconomic policies and poverty. Section 3 
presents the model and discusses the data used to run the model and carry out poverty 
analysis. Section 4 discusses simulations and results obtained. Section 5 summarizes the 
results, discusses policy observations emanating from the study and suggests areas for 
future research. 
2.  Country background and policy on trade, macroeconomics and poverty 
2.1.  Trade and macroeconomic policy evolution 
South Africa’s trade policy is driven largely by the Department of Trade and Industry. 
According to Bell (1992, 1997), South African trade policy was broadly geared towards 
import substitution between 1925 and the 1970s. By the 1960s, manufacturing growth had 
begun to slow down. As well, there was dissatisfaction with the continued dependence of the 
economy on gold for foreign exchange reserves. According to Roberts and Thoburn (2002), 
this failure of import substitution to enhance growth and diversify the economy away from 
gold is what triggered a change in trade policy direction away from import substitution 
beginning in the 1970s. In the 1980s there were renewed attempts to reform the trade 
regime. Quantitative restrictions continued to be reduced throughout. According to Belli et al. 
(1993), the 1980s as a whole ended up being highly protective as South Africa ended up 
with not only the highest tariff rates but also the widest tariff range. Tariff dispersion had 
become very high. In 1990 there were renewed attempts to increase exports through the 
General Export Incentive Scheme (GEIS). In the mid-1990s with political change gripping the 
country, there was a review of macroeconomic and industrial policy regimes that marked the 
start of the process of fully-fledged trade liberalization. In 1994, a decision to phase out the 
GEIS that was considered to be inconsistent with General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules was reached, and eventually they 
were terminated in 1997
4.  
In 1994 most of the quantitative restrictions had been removed, although quantitative 
restrictions on agricultural products were still in place. In the same year, the country signed 
the Marrakech Agreement under the Uruguay Round of the GATT. In that settlement, the 
country agreed binding 98 percent of all tariff lines. As well, the deal involved reducing the 
number of tariff lines to six, rationalising the twelve thousand commodity lines and 
replacement of quantitative restrictions on agriculture by tariff equivalents. South Africa has 
made a lot of progress towards meeting these commitments, reforming and simplifying its 
tariff structure. The total number of Harmonised System (HS) 8-digit) commodity lines 
declined to 6,700 in 2004. The HS 8-digit lines bearing formula duties declined from 1900 in 
1993 to 5 in 2002 (WTO, 1998,2002). The number of lines with specific tariffs fell from 500 in  
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1993 to 195 in 2002. Commodity lines with mixed non-ad valorem duties have fallen from 
160 in 2000 to 60 in 2004. Despite these efforts towards simplifying the tariff regime, the 
number of ad valorem rates still stands at 38 which is higher than the 6 offered in the 1994 
GATT/WTO Uruguay Round offer. Including the non-ad valorem tariff rates raises the 
number to over 100 different rates. This suggests that while progress has been made with 
trade liberalization, the tariff structure still remains dispersed (discriminatory) and complex. 
South Africa’s trade policy is not only driven by multilateral arrangements but also by 
bilateral and regional agreements. The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) between 
South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland (BLNS) is the oldest Customs 
Union in the world. It came into force on 1 March 1970 as a replacement of the Customs 
Union Agreement of 1910. Its main aim is to facilitate free trade amongst member countries 
as well as to provide for a common external and excise tariff to the Customs Union. A key 
feature of SACU is that all customs and excise collected in the common customs area are 
shared among members according to a revenue-sharing formula. There are two significant 
Free Trade Areas (FTAs) that the country has so far concluded. The first is the European 
Union (EU) – South Africa FTA that was agreed in 1999 and became operational in January 
2000. This agreement is asymmetric in nature. While 95 percent of South Africa’s exports to 
the EU will be free of duty at the end of the 12-year lifespan of the agreement, South Africa 
is obligated to open only 86 percent of its imports from the EU (about 73 percent of its 
industrial tariff lines) in the same period. There are some exemptions for clothing and 
textiles, footwear and automotive products where tariffs are scaled down but not completely 
removed. 
The second FTA is with the Southern Africa Development Corporation (SADC) which 
consists of Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. It came into effect in August 1996 but was not ratified by all parties at that time. 
The Protocol was implemented in September 2000 after ratification by 11 members. South 
Africa as the dominant economy in the region is obliged in the agreement to undertake faster 
liberalisation reforms and a set of “general offers”. On the other hand the other countries are 
allowed a set of “differential offers” implemented over a longer period than South Africa. The 
agreement is expected to be phased in over eight years. According to this schedule, 98 
percent of SADC regional trade should be on duty free basis by 2012. 
South Africa still has certain general preference schemes with Zimbabwe and 
Malawi. South Africa held the first meeting on the Joint Commission of Co-operation with 
Angola in February 2003. The country also benefits from the United States of America 
(USA)’s African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) scheme which was signed in 2000. It is  
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estimated that approximately 6500 South African products qualify for export under this 
preference scheme for 8 years starting in 2000. The USA International Trade Commission 
estimates that AGOA accounted for US$1.7 billion worth of exports from South Africa in 
2004 (30 percent of South Africa exports to the USA), up from US$1.3 billion in 2002. The 
expiry of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) in December 2004 has the likely 
effect of narrowing the difference on export prices of AGOA-eligible countries and AGOA – 
non eligible competitors such as China and India. There are other planned FTAs with India, 
the USA and MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) countries. In addition 
South Africa and Tanzania have signed a memorandum of understanding on trade and 
industry programmes and a general agreement on economic, scientific, technical and 
cultural co-operation. 
Since South Africa emerged from the apartheid era in 1994 it has had an urgent need 
to complement political liberation and openness to global trade and investment with 
economic growth that would benefit all members of the population. Trade liberalisation was 
accelerated in 1994 and was supported by tariff liberalisation, export orientation policies, and 
the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The RDP was aimed at reducing 
mass poverty and social inequality. The strategy to address the inherited poverty and 
inequality rested upon the RDP’s four pillars, namely building the economy, meeting basic 
needs, developing human resources and democratizing the state. Government departments 
were then supposed to ensure that poverty reduction aims are met through directly targeting 
the poor via service delivery. The RDP was succeeded by the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) macroeconomic strategy in 1996. GEAR was aimed at reducing fiscal 
deficits, lowering inflation, maintaining exchange rate stability, decreasing barriers to trade 
and liberalizing capital flows. As priorities shifted from stabilization towards development, 
government commenced work on a new initiative in 2003 and subsequently launched 
officially the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) in February 
2006. In broad terms, it aims to lift GDP growth to a sustained 6 percent per annum by 2014 
by reducing obstacles, share this growth more equitably, and allow South Africa to achieve 
its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Labour absorption is another target to come out 
of this increased growth. Improvements in infrastructure, stabilization of the currency, 
reduction of inefficiencies and costs of doing business, increase in skills of workers, 
removing barriers to entry and to competitions are all the various ways incorporated within 
the initiative. While generally welcome, a number of analysts have raised several cautions, 
including issues of capacity in key public sector areas, skills shortage and infrastructure 
backlogs. 
Since 1994, public spending on the poor has taken two main forms, namely  
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mainstreaming social expenditures into government budgets and separate, specialized 
poverty relief funds. Most of the financing for poverty reduction is planned so that it occurs 
through the regular budget of the various government departments. These mainstream 
interventions can be disaggregated into three basic forms of social development 
programmes, namely infrastructure programmes (directed at the provision of basic 
household and individual needs, incorporating local public goods and services such as 
water, sanitation, energy, housing, health and education), social security system (which 
extends safety nets to certain cohorts and includes non-contributory and means-tested 
social assistance grants provided by the government to vulnerable groups that are unable to 
fulfil their basic needs, namely child grants, the old age pension and the disability grant, and 
other measures such as school feeding programmes) and social expenditure focused on job-
creation measures (entails skills training, the promotion of small, medium and micro 
enterprises, job summit programmes, expanded public works programs and land 
redistribution). Many social and human rights have also been secured through the 
constitution, offering legal protection to the poor, vulnerable and marginalized. Furthermore, 
policies have been put in place to overcome the legacy of inequality by means of affirmative 
action in the labour market and by black economic empowerment (BEE) policies to 
encourage asset transfers towards the previously disadvantaged ethnic groups.  
2.2   Macroeconomic outcomes 
As shown in Figure 1, the economic performance of post apartheid South Africa has 
been improving gradually, from an average real GDP growth rate of about 3 percent 
between 1995 and 1993 to 4.5 percent in 2004 and 4.9 percent in 2005. Per capita GDP 
growth has followed a similar trend. 
 














Source: South African Reserve Bank (SARB) database (www.reservebank.co.za).  
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Table 1 shows that the major sources or drivers of this economic performance have 
been final consumption by households, followed by exports and then final consumption by 
general government. Final household consumption by far outstripped the contributions made 
by the other components, at least doubling the contribution made by exports, the second 
highest contributor. The average contribution for the 1995 –2005 period was 63.4 percent for 
household final consumption whilst that of exports, the second highest was 26.4 percent. 
The increased improvement in the country’s real growth performance was also 
associated with a marked improvement in most aggregate expenditure components. 
Expenditure on imports, gross fixed investment, exports and household expenditure on 
goods and services have all grown by over 4 percent while government expenditure on 
goods and services has lagged behind growth in these other categories. A worrying feature 
is the sharp growth in imports relative to exports and the rest of the economy, which raises 
concerns over balance of payments problems. 
Table 1: GDP by expenditure category and category growth rates (average 1995–2005) 
  Share of GDP (percent)  Growth rates (percent) 
Final consumption expenditure by households  63.4  4.1
Final consumption expenditure by general government   18.9  2.5
Gross fixed capital formation  15.9  5.6
Exports of goods and services  26.4  4.4
Imports of goods and services  26.3  6.2
Expenditure on gross domestic product   100  -
Source: Calculations using data from South African Reserve Bank (SARB) database 
(www.reservebank.co.za). 
2.3  Trade structure and performance outcomes 
Trends in exports, imports and net exports from 1992 to 2005 are illustrated in Figure 
2 below. As shown in the figure, there has been a substantial increase in exports and 
imports from 1992 to 2005. The aggregate response of trade to the opening up in the 
economy has been quite dramatic, reflecting the post apartheid reintegration. The slowdown 
in 1997-99 was probably related to the Asian crisis, but may also reflect the ending of the 
impetus provided by the ending of apartheid as observed by Davies and van Seventer 
(2003). The acceleration after 1999 reflects both world recovery and domestic liberalisation 
policies starting to make an impact (Davies and van Seventer 2003).  
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Source: Calculations using data from The Department of Trade and Industry website 
(www.thedti.gov.za).  
As shown in Figure 3, the increase in trade has been dominated by growth in 
imports. The balance of trade has turned negative from 2004. Exports are dominated by 
resources-based and relatively low value-added commodities while imports are primarily 
dominated by higher value-added goods. If one were to exclude gold merchandise exports, 
the top five export categories are precious and semi-precious stones and precious metals, 
mineral products, vehicles and other transport equipment, machinery and mechanical 
appliances and electrical equipment, and base metals and articles thereof. The top five 
import product categories comprise machinery and mechanical appliances, mineral 
products, chemicals, vehicles, and original motor vehicle components.  











































Source: Calculations using data from The Department of Trade and Industry website (www.thedti.gov.za).  
2.4  Poverty and income distribution outcomes 
According to the World Bank (1999), extreme poverty is concentrated mainly in rural 
areas where over 75 per cent of the households cannot meet the minimum food 
requirements. Using a poverty line of 1 US$ per capita per day, the study argues that urban 
poverty is much less acute, with only about 10 per cent of the households below the poverty  
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line. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (2000) gives the rate of poverty as 
45 percent. This is despite the fact that South Africa is classified as an upper middle- income 
country. Poverty differs greatly by region, race and employment status (Klassen and 
Woolard 1998). Although poverty is not confined to any one race group, it is concentrated 
among blacks, particularly Africans. 61 percent of Africans and 38 percent of coloureds are 
poor, compared with 5 percent of Indians and 1 percent of Whites. Poverty also runs along 
provincial lines, with those living in former homelands having a relatively larger share of the 
poverty as shown in Figure 4 (Gelb 2003). Poverty is distributed unevenly among the nine 
provinces. Provincial poverty rates are highest for the Eastern Cape (48 percent), Free State 
(48 percent), North-West (37 percent), Limpopo (38 percent), Northern Province (37 percent) 
and Mpumalanga (25 percent), and lowest for Gauteng (12 percent) and the Western Cape 
(12 percent). 

























Source: Stats SA 2000; Legend: Household poverty line based on monthly consumption expenditure 
of R800 or less in 1996 prices. Eastern Cape (EC),Free State (FS), Gauteng (G), KwaZulu-Natal 
(KZN),Limpopo (L), Mpumalanga (M), Northern Cape (NC),North West (NW),Northern Province 
(NP),Western Cape (WC). 
The country’s Gini coefficient remained at a consistently high level between 1975 and 
1991, but within this was hidden changes occurring among races. Table 2 shows the 
changes in inequality in South Africa as a whole as well as the changes by population group 
and type of area using three inequality measures: the Gini Index, mean log deviation, and 
the Theil Index. As shown in the table, the Gini coefficient for South Africa slightly increased 
from 0.56 to 0.58, indicating increasing income differentials. Mean log deviation went up 
from 0.56 to 0.61. The distribution between and among racial groups significantly worsened 
over the five-year period. There was a significant increase in inequality among the African 
population. Inequality also slightly increased among Coloreds and slightly decreased among 
Asians and Whites. In addition inequality slightly increased between the urban and rural 
areas.  
  11
Table 2: Changes in inequality between 1995 and 2000 
 
Source: Hoogeveen and Özler (2004). 
3.  The sequential dynamic CGE model for poverty analysis 
3.1 The  Model 
This section presents the structure of the poverty focused sequential dynamic CGE 
model that is applied to South African data. This model is based on Annabi et al. (2005 a,b). 
The static part of the model follows from the EXTER model of Decaluwé et al (2001) which is 
discussed at length in the context of South Africa in Cockburn et al. (forthcoming). The full 
set of equations is available from the authors upon request. 
Sequential dynamics is built into the EXTER model for a small open economy so that 
the dynamics do not influence world prices and interest rates. Early recursive dynamic CGE 
models include the work of Bchir et al. (2002), Bourguignon et al. (1989) as well as Jung and 
Thorbecke (2000). Taking into account South African CGE literature, the model’s dynamic 
structure is similar to that proposed by Thurlow (2004). Arndt and Lewis (2001) develop a 
similar model structure to analyse the consequences of AIDS on the economy. Rattsø and 
Stokke (2005) analyse trade liberalization in an intertemporal dynamic Ramsey model and 
their growth specification is of direct relevance to our model.  
The static part of the model broadly has a production and demand side interacting  
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simultaneously. Overall output is modeled using a Leontief production structure. Value 
added in turn is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) combination of labour and capital. 
Total capital demand is derived from cost minimization subject to the CES function. Labour 
is a CES aggregation of skilled and unskilled labour. The labour categorization is based on 
the following occupations: 
(1)  Skilled labour includes legislators, professionals, technicians; 
(2)  Semi-skilled labour includes clerks, service workers, skilled agricultural workers, 
craft workers, plant and  machine operators; and 
(3)  Unskilled labour includes elementary occupations, domestic workers. 
Semi skilled and unskilled labour are lumped together to form an unskilled aggregate. 
All labour categories are assumed mobile across sectors and wages are crucial for income 
distribution. Capital, on the other hand, is sector-specific in the short run, implying rising 
supply curves on the real side but is allowed greater mobility in the long run when dynamics 
set in. As a result of this asymmetry, we would expect greater volatility in the rental capital 
return in the short run and broad convergence in the long run. The choice between domestic 
and imported inputs is specified as a CES function. On the demand side, households 
maximise Stone Geary type utility functions subject to their budget constraints, yielding linear 
expenditure system demands. The Armington assumption is used to model the choice 
between domestic and imported goods by households for final consumption. General 
equilibrium requires that the goods and factor markets are in equilibrium and the 
fundamental macroeconomic identity is satisfied. The goods market clears when demand 
and supply are equated via the material balance condition in each period. The fundamental 
macroeconomic identity requires the equality between investment and savings. The model 
has two broad options for revenue compensation in response to a trade liberalization that 
may reduce tariff revenue. The adjustments could be on the indirect tax rate or on the direct 
tax rate. Finally, the nominal exchange rate is chosen to be the numéraire for each period. 
The static model is made sequential dynamic by a set of cumulation and updating 
rules from one year to the next. Growth in the total supply of labour is endogenous and is 
driven by an exogenous population growth rate. Since we lack data about the evolution of 
the labour participation rate in the future, we use the growth rate of population instead of the 
labour force and this implies that the labour participation rate is constant over time. It is also 
assumed that minimal consumption in the linear expenditure system grows according to the 
population growth rate.  
Current period's investment augments the capital stock in the next period. Capital 
stock for each sector is updated by an accumulation function that equates next-period capital  
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stock ( 1 , + t i K ), to the depreciated capital stock of the current period and the current period's 
quantity of investment ( t i INV , ) as follows: 
() t i t i t i INV K K , , 1 , 1 + − = + δ  
A key question to resolve is how to allocate new investments between the different 
competing sectors. The literature suggests two approaches: using a capital distribution 
function (see Abbink et al. (1995)) or using an investment demand equation. We opt for the 
investment demand approach that fits in well with the data that we have available on 
investment by destination. There are now a number of alternative specifications of the 
investment by destination functions in the literature (see for example Bchir et al. 2002). The 
most well known in dynamic CGE circles and one that we use in this work follows from the 
work of Bourguignon et al. (1989) and later elaborated on in Jung and Thorbecke (2000). It 
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where  i 1 κ  and  i 2 κ  are positive parameters calibrated on the basis of the investment 
elasticity and the investment equilibrium equation. The investment rate is increasing with 
respect to the ratio of the rate of physical return to capital (
i
t R ) and its user cost ( t U ). The 
user cost is the resulting dual price of investment multiplied by the sum of the depreciation 
rate and exogenous real interest rate. Investment by destination is used to satisfy the 
equality condition by being set equal to the investment by origin observations found in the 
benchmark data. It is also used to calibrate the sectoral capital stocks in the base run.  
All other variables that are nominally indexed such as transfers are also subject to 
dynamic updating. The model is solved over a twenty-year time horizon and is checked to 
confirm that it is homogeneous of degree zero in prices and satisfies Walras Law. 
To carry out poverty analysis, we follow the top down approach. This procedure 
involves first obtaining results summarizing the effects of trade liberalization from the 
sequential dynamic CGE model. In a second step, these results are fed into a micro 
simulation household model to obtain the predicted household effects. Data from the 2000 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey of South Africa and Labour Force Survey were 
used (Statistics South Africa, 2001, 2002)
5. The survey is nationally representative and has 
detailed information on household consumption patterns, income and household 
characteristics such as area, gender, number of persons and socio-economic 
characteristics. Non – parametric approaches are used based on the observed distribution of  
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these households in the survey, their sample weights, number of individuals in the 
household and their independent characteristics of ethnicity, skill type and region. We have 
used the publicly available and efficient software called Distribution Analysis Software (DAD) 
for poverty analysis (Duclos et al. 2002). DAD allows us to compute many poverty 
descriptive indicators. The one that we are interested in for this particular study are the well 
known Foster Greer and Thorbecke (FGT) measures which can be summarised thus (see 












=− ∑  
where j is a subgroup of individuals with consumption below the poverty line (z), N is 
the total sample size, y is expenditure of a particular individual j and α is a parameter for 
distinguishing between the alternative FGT indices
6. 
3.2 The  Data 
To capture the base year structure of the South African economy, we have relied on 
a 2000 South African Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) that was developed by Thurlow and 
van Seventer (2002) under the auspices of the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI). The original SAM includes 43 sectors, 14 household types, a government sector, 
enterprise and the rest of the world. The SAM has 4 factors of production, namely capital, 
unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled labour. In this study, an aggregated version of this SAM 
that includes 10 sectors, 3 factors of production (capital, skilled and unskilled labor) and 16 
household types distinguished by region, skill and ethnicity is used. The latter is the main 
difference between the SAM used in this study and that of Thurlow and van Seventer (2002). 
The following are the 10 sectors used including their constituent parts: 
1.  Agriculture – comprising agriculture, fishing and forestry, referred to as AGRI 
2.  Mining – comprising gold, coal and other mining, referred to as MINI 
3.  Food – comprising food, beverages and tobacco, referred to as FOOD 
4.  Textiles – comprising textiles, apparel, leather and footwear, referred to as TEXT 
5.  Manufacturing – comprising paper products, printing, rubber, plastic, glass, non 
metal mineral products, iron, non ferrous metals, machinery, electric machinery, 
communication equipment, scientific equipment, other industries, wood, metal 
products and furniture, referred to as MANF 
6.  Petroleum, referred to as PETRO 
7.  Chemicals – comprising basic chemicals and other chemicals, referred to as CHEM 
8.  Vehicles – comprising vehicles and transport equipment, referred to as VEHI 
9.  Capital Goods–comprising electricity, water and construction, referred to as CONS  
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10.  Services – comprising wholesale, trade, hotels and accommodation, transport 
services, communication, finance and insurance, business services, medical and 
other services, other producers and government services, referred to as SERV 
According to Table 3, services is the largest sector in terms of value added, making 
up over 66 percent of value added, followed by manufacturing, mining and capital goods 
which together account for about 20 percent of value added. Unlike other sub-Saharan 
African countries, the share of the agriculture and food sectors in value added is very small, 
each contributing roughly 3 percent of value added. While the economywide tariff is relatively 
low at about 3.2 percent, this masks significant sectoral variation which highly distorts the 
trade regime. The highly protected sectors are textiles (11.9 percent), food (6.2 percent), 
vehicles (4.3 percent) and chemicals (3.6 percent). Agriculture is mildly protected, facing an 
average protection of 1 percent. The remaining sectors, notably mining, capital goods, 
petroleum and services are receiving little to no protection. 
Mining is the most dominant sector on the trade scene, contributing about 34 percent 
of total exports. This is followed by manufacturing (26 percent) and then services (15 
percent). An almost similar pattern is repeated by looking at export intensity. This measure 
shows that mining, manufacturing, petroleum and chemicals are very important intensive 
exporters of their output. Notice that these sectors are the most capital intensive in the 
economy. The relatively labour intensive sectors of textiles and services have small export 
intensities. With the exception of capital goods and services, the rest of the sectors face 
significant competition from foreigners for the domestic market.  
Table 3: Initial sectoral shares 
   Tariff Sectoral share in  Import Export  Share in Value Added Sectoral Sectoral 
   rate  Value Added Imports ExportsPenetrationIntensityWages  Capital  Wage ShareCapital Share
Agriculture 0.70  3.16  1.60  2.71 6.39 11.37 1.07 2.09 2.10 4.27
Mining 0.01 6.49  10.20  33.44 49.48 78.08 3.09 3.40 6.05 6.95
Food 6.15  3.11  4.60  5.28 7.97 9.92 1.38 1.73 2.70 3.54
Textiles 11.87  1.05  3.51  2.16 17.00 12.25 0.81 0.24 1.59 0.49
Manufacturing 5.42  8.77  35.58  26.07 26.82 22.95 5.05 3.72 9.89 7.61
Petroleum 0.07  1.39  1.21  3.53 31.56 30.12 0.20 1.19 0.39 2.43
Chemicals 3.58  2.05  9.74  5.67 25.43 18.05 1.10 0.95 2.15 1.95
Vehicles 4.28  1.50  15.37  6.14 35.63 19.69 0.89 0.61 1.73 1.25
Capital Goods  0.00  5.53  0.47  0.53 0.90 1.13 2.63 2.90 5.14 5.93
Services 0.00 66.95  17.73  14.48 4.57 4.16 34.88 32.07 68.25 65.59
TOTAL 3.21  100.00  100.00  100.00 12.56 13.74 51.10 48.90 100.00 100.00
Source: Own computations based on constructed SAM 2000 
The IFPRI SAM identifies 14 representative households according to their levels of 
income. Unlike the IFPRI SAM where households are identified according to income level 
(an endogenous variable in our model), in this paper households are defined taking into  
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account exogenous characteristic of the representative groups such as rural-urban, ethnicity 
and skill level of the head of household. We have used the Income and Expenditure Survey 
(IES) of 2000 and the Labour Force Survey (LFS) of September 2000 to form the following 
16 households: 
UASK      Urban African Skilled Households 
UCSK    Urban  Coloured  Skilled  Households 
UISK      Urban Indian Skilled Households 
UWSK     Urban White Skilled Households 
UAUSK    Urban African Unskilled Households 
UCUSK    Urban Coloured Unskilled Households 
UIUSK    Urban  Indian  Unskilled  Households 
UWUSK    Urban White Unskilled Households 
RASK      Rural African Skilled Households 
RCSK    Rural  Coloured  Skilled  Households 
RISK      Rural Indian Skilled Households 
UWSK     Rural White Skilled Households 
RAUSK    Rural African Unskilled Households 
RCUSK    Rural Coloured Unskilled Households 
RIUSK     Rural Indian Unskilled Households 
RWUSK    Rural White Unskilled Households 
Urban households spend disproportionately more of their income on services than 
rural households. It’s important to recall that services have no nominal protection. On the 
other hand, rural households spend disproportionately more on primary agriculture 
commodities and foodstuffs than their urban counterparts. Both these commodities receive 
some amount of protection. When it comes to manufactured goods, we notice that urban 
households consume marginally more than rural households. Ethnicity also plays a role. 
Whites are the most important consumers of services, followed by Indians. Whites also 
consume disproportionately more of primary agriculture than other racial groups. Africans 
and Coloureds are by far the most important consumers of foodstuffs. Indians consume 
disproportionately more of the mining good than any other group while Whites consume 
significantly fewer textiles than other groups. Coloureds consume less manufactured goods 
than all other groups. These consumption patterns imply that changes in the consumer 
prices of these goods resulting from trade policy intervention have quite differential impacts 
on each household category depending on which goods experience price rises or falls.  
The SAM data indicates the structure of the economy. However, we also need 
information on behavioural functions and this is typically captured from econometric  
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estimates found in the literature. In our case, the Armington elasticities are obtained from the 
Industrial Development Corporation’s general equilibrium model for South Africa (IDC, 
2000). The estimation procedure used to arrive at these elasticities is discussed in IDC 
(2000). There were no econometric studies of export substitution elasticities and we have 
followed the suggestion in Thurlow (2004) to set these higher than Armington elasticities
7. 
There are also no econometric estimates of commodity demand with respect to income that 
we could use, and hence we relied on those in Thurlow (2004). There is obviously a need for 
further econometric estimation of these elasticities and extended sensitivity analysis around 
the estimates.  
A major hurdle that needed to be cleared involved what poverty line to use for the 
analysis. The choice was made difficult by the fact that there is no official poverty line for 
South Africa and different analysts use different poverty lines. Some researchers use the 
‘cost of basic needs’ approach to draw normative poverty lines. Using this approach, 
Hoogeveen and Özler (2004) argue that a reasonable poverty line for South Africa lies 
between R322 (lower bound poverty line) and R593 (upper bound poverty line) per capita 
per month in 2000 prices. There is also the internationally known US$2 per day poverty line 
that translates to R174 per capita per month. As pointed out in Hoogeveen and Özler (2004), 
this is very similar to the poverty line of R105 per capita per month in 1993 prices used by 
Deaton (1997). The ‘dollar a day’ poverty line is also another poverty line typically used. It 
translates to R87 per capita per month in 2000 prices. Table 4 reports computed poverty 
measures using these different poverty lines.  
Table 4: FGT measures for different poverty lines in South Africa 
   P0  P1  P2 
   1 US$p.d 2US$p.d R322/m R593/m 1US$p.d2US$p.dR322/mR593/m1US$p.d 2US$p.d R322/mR593/m
SA 9.2  29.6  52.6  70.4  2.8 11.2 25.6 42.6 1.3 5.7  15.4 29.8
Source: Own computations based on Income and Expenditure Survey 2000 
Notes: P0, P1 and P2 are respectively poverty headcount, poverty gap and squared poverty gap. The 
first two poverty lines are on a per capita per day basis while the latter two are on a per capita per 
month basis. 
In this study we make use of the 3864 South African rands per year as suggested by 
Hoogeveen and Özler (2004) and Cockburn et al (forthcoming). The poverty results are 
reported in Table 5.   
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Table 5: Poverty and inequality indexes (in percent) 
   Initial Values in 2000 
   P0  P1  P2 
South Africa  53 25.3 15
Residential Area 
Urban 42.4 18.4  10.2
Rural 68.3 35.4  22.1
Ethnic group 
African household  61 29.5  17.6
Coloured household  36.2 14.7  7.8
Indian household  6.4 2.3  0.8
White household  0.1 0  0
Region, Ethnic and skill group 
Urban African Skilled  0 0  0
Urban Coloured Skilled  0 0  0
Urban Indian Skilled  0 0  0
Urban White Skilled  0 0  0
Urban African Unskilled  17.9 10.08  5.5
Urban Coloured Unskilled  8.3 5.02  2.1
Urban Indian Unskilled  1.8 0.78  0.25
Urban White Unskilled  0.02 0  0
Rural African Skilled  0 0  0
Rural Coloured Skilled  0 0  0
Rural Indian Skilled  0 0  0
Rural White Skilled  0 0  0
Rural African Unskilled  43.6 15.4  11.2
Rural Coloured Unskilled  29.7 11.6  3.4
Rural Indian Unskilled  3.9 1.5  0.4
Rural White Unskilled  0.06 0  0
Legend: P0=Poverty headcount; P1= Poverty gap; and P2= Poverty severity 
According to Table 5, 53 percent of South Africans were poor in 2000 according to 
the lower bound ‘cost of basic needs approach’ poverty line. The poverty gap was 25 
percent while the poverty gap squared (severity) was 15 percent. Poverty headcount, its 
incidence and severity are more widespread in rural areas than in urban areas (see Table 5). 
It is clear that poverty affects mainly unskilled African and Coloured households where 61 
and 36.2 percent respectively are classified as poor. Poverty is very low among Asian 
households and is even lower amongst White households at 0.1 percent. All skilled 
households are not poor. To understand the absence of poor individuals in the household 
headed by skilled workers, recall that skilled labour categories include legislators, 
professionals and technicians. We use the SAM data to categorize households into income 
quintiles (E1), themselves being based on percentiles (P1-P12) as follows: 
(1)  E1  low (percentiles P1 and P2); 
(2)  E2  low middle (P3 to P5); 
(3)  E3  middle (P6 to P8); 
(4)  E4  high middle (P9 and P10); and 
(5)  E5  high (P11 and P12).  
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Figure 5 then to correlate skills with income levels. As would have been expected, 
the skilled employees contribute mostly at the medium and high income, and the unskilled to 
medium and low income levels. This largely explains the absence of poor individuals in the 
household headed by skilled workers as shown in Table 5.  
Figure 5: Skills Distribution in the various Income Categories 
Own computations based on constructed 2000 SAM  
4. Simulation  results 
Trade liberalisation is simulated in this paper by a complete removal of all tariffs on 
imported goods and services, and by a combination of tariff removal and an increase of the 
total factor productivity. The two scenarios are described below in greater details.  
Unilateral trade liberalization: The core simulation is a unilateral trade liberalization 
involving a complete removal of all import tariffs. This is assumed to take place from 2008 
and the new tariff revenue is maintained until 2020. 
Unilateral trade liberalization coupled with dynamic trade induced Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) increases: This simulation is similar to the first one but includes TFP 
effects induced by trade liberalization commencing in 2008. The motivation for this 
simulation is as follows. The dynamic effects captured in the first simulation are due to more 
efficient allocation of capital and labour to sectors over time, as factor supplies grow, and 
caused by trade liberalization. In other words, it is the comparative static story of trade 
liberalization repeated year by year as factor supplies grow. This channel usually leads to 
very small impacts. New trade theory has moved beyond only looking at neoclassical market 
structures to consider phenomena such as increasing returns to scale, imperfect 
competition, technology transfers and dynamic links such as those between trade 
liberalization and total factor productivity (TFP)
8. The model is extended so as to capture 














exhibit Hicks neutral technical change in the supply and value added equations. Under the 
hypothesis of trade induced technological improvements a growth of 3 percent (1 percent 
technological and 2 percent factor growth) from the year 2008 onwards is assumed and this 
is run together with the trade liberalization scenario described above.  
In both simulations, the assumption made is that the government budget equilibrium 
is arranged by an endogenous uniform increase in indirect taxes through the Euler price 
equations. Alternative compensatory tax mechanisms – direct income tax, sales tax and 
value-added tax – could also be used. The fiscal policy aspects of the model are indeed a 
crucial aspect which is likely to have short and long term welfare effects although uniform 
compensation measures do not have strong distributional impacts. A long term trend of 
indirect compensation will impact household welfare as growth induces more revenues 
collection from other fiscal sources and less compensatory tax levy on products. An 
adjustment variable is introduced in the investment demand functions to handle savings-
investment equilibrium. As pointed out in Annabi et al (2005), it is important to note that in 
dynamic analysis the economy is growing even without a shock. As a result, the relevant 
counterfactual to compare the results to is this ‘business as usual’ (BAU) growth path unlike 
in static CGE analysis where the relevant counterfactual is the base year SAM.  
4.1  Unilateral trade liberalization 
Macroeconomic effects 
Table 6 below summarizes the macroeconomic effects of a full trade liberalization 
scenario without including dynamic trade induced productivity gains. Immediately we can 
see that trade liberalization has a very small effect on the macroeconomy, an observation 
that is consistent with the observation that South Africa already has very low import tariffs so 
that their removal will not have major impacts on the economy. Taking 2009 as the short run, 
Table 6 shows that trade liberalization increases GDP by only 0.02 percent in the short run 
and leads to small but positive increases in GDP over the rest of the policy period (2010-
2020) due mainly to accumulation effects. The minor short run contraction in 2008 is 
explained by the contraction in previously highly protected sectors induced by increased 
import competition when the period is too short for capital to have relocated to the expanding 
export intensive sectors
9.   
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2007 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2008 -0.01 -1.75 0.67  2.74 2.87 -1.87 -1.80 -1.53 -2.61 -1.90
2009 0.02  -1.63 0.67 2.96 2.98 -1.76 -1.65 -1.46  -2.34  -1.84
2010 0.05  -1.53 0.69 3.14 3.08 -1.67 -1.53 -1.41  -2.06  -1.79
2011 0.07  -1.44 0.71 3.30 3.17 -1.58 -1.43 -1.36  -1.86  -1.76
2012 0.10  -1.37 0.73 3.44 3.25 -1.51 -1.33 -1.32  -1.72  -1.73
2013 0.12  -1.30 0.74 3.56 3.32 -1.45 -1.25 -1.28  -1.63  -1.70
2014 0.14  -1.24 0.74 3.66 3.37 -1.39 -1.17 -1.25  -1.57  -1.68
2015 0.17  -1.19 0.75 3.74 3.42 -1.33 -1.11 -1.23  -1.53  -1.66
2016 0.18  -1.14 0.75 3.82 3.46 -1.29 -1.05 -1.21  -1.52  -1.65
2017 0.20  -1.10 0.76 3.88 3.50 -1.25 -1.00 -1.20  -1.51  -1.64
2018 0.22  -1.07 0.76 3.93 3.53 -1.21 -0.96 -1.19  -1.51  -1.63
2019 0.23  -1.04 0.76 3.98 3.56 -1.18 -0.93 -1.18  -1.51  -1.62
2020 0.24  -1.02 0.75 4.01 3.58 -1.15 -0.90 -1.18  -1.51  -1.62
Both the rental and the user cost of capital decline in both the short and long run, but 
the rental return to user cost ratio increases in the long run. As a result, we notice that full 
trade liberalization leads to growth in investment by destination, with the long run response 
being stronger than the short run response. Similarly, the trade liberalization induced decline 
in domestic import prices leads to an increase in imports in the short and long run. The 
consumer price index also falls in the short and long run in response to reduced production 
costs made possible by lowering of tariffs. This, coupled with the ensuing decrease in 
domestic costs of production and the real exchange rate depreciation induces exports to 
increase in the short and long run. Exports grow more than imports in the long run. Because 
of the volume movement in exports and imports, sales on the domestic market fall. Both 
skilled and unskilled wages decline throughout the period following reduced demand for 
labour from the contracting labour intensive sectors. The short run contraction is more 
severe than the long run contraction since in the long run capital will have reallocated to the 
more efficient sectors compared to the short run. As well, unskilled wage rates contract 
much less than skilled wages. In line with GDP developments, welfare as measured by the 
dynamic equivalent variation also falls initially in the short run but increases thereafter. 
These welfare changes are consistent with the fall in consumer price index being less than 
the fall in consumption in the short run while the fall in consumption in the long run is less 
than the fall in consumer price index. Based on the headcount ratio it can be concluded that 
poverty headcount is largely unaffected in the short run but declines in the long run. The 
amounts involved are very small.  
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Sectoral effects 
Table 7 summarizes the main sectoral effects following a complete trade 
liberalization. The initial impact of the unilateral tariff removal is felt in import prices that fall 
for those sectors initially with positive levels of protection as shown in the Table. The fall in 
import prices is related directly to initial tariff protection, hence import prices fall the most in 
the textiles sector which has the highest initial protection, followed by food, manufacturing, 
vehicles, chemicals and agriculture. The import prices for the remaining sectors is virtually 
unchanged since their import duty is zero or very small. The reduction in domestic import 
prices and initial import penetration ratios for each sector are what explain the resulting 
sectoral import demands following unilateral trade liberalization (see Table 7). Imports rise 
the most for textiles, followed by food, manufacturing, vehicles and chemical products. The 
increase is higher in the long run compared to the short run. These sectors have relatively 
higher initial tariff protection and import penetration. Imports remain virtually unchanged or 
fall slightly both in the short run and in the long run for the other sectors, most notably for 
agriculture, petroleum, services, capital goods and mining. The sectors in which imports fall 
are also the ones with the lowest initial tariff protection as consumers substitute towards 
other goods which have experienced relative cheapening following trade liberalization.  
The increase in imports results in a depreciating exchange rate. With world export 
prices given by the small country assumption, the exchange rate depreciation leads to 
increases in domestic export prices which induce export volumes to increase. As can be 
observed in Table 7, exports go up both in the short run and in the long run for all sectors 
except textiles. They go up most dramatically in the mining sector given its initial higher 
export intensity (78 percent) compared to other sectors. With the exception of mining and 
petroleum, the long run growth of exports is lower than that in the short run. But interestingly, 
exports fall even more in the long run for the textiles sector, despite the fact that this is the 
sector with initially the highest protection levels. This result is due to a combination of falling 
production induced by dwindling domestic demand as well as the negative effect of domestic 
indirect tax adjustment which falls disproportionately more on this sector. Thus, the 
increased competition has reduced output and export for textiles. 
The developments in value added prices, factor remunerations and input costs to a 
large extent influence the reallocation (static efficiency) and accumulation (dynamic) effects 
of trade liberalization. Figure 6 shows the evolution of value added prices. Value added 
prices increase in the short run for mining, which receives the greatest positive stimulus from 
the trade induced real exchange rate depreciation. All other sectors experience declining 
value added prices in the short run. All sectors experience declining prices in the long run, 
but with mining being the least affected.  3 
Table 7: Sectoral effects of unilateral trade liberalization (BAU =1) 










































AGRI  0.9931  0.9931  0.9810  0.9856  1.0323  1.0247  1.0024  0.9984  1.0018 0.9961 1.0009 1.0003 0.9973 0.9966 1.0006 0.9992 1.0081 1.0013 
MINI  0.9999  0.9999  0.9975  0.9870  1.0176  1.0909  1.0328  1.0700  1.0321 1.0675 1.0106 1.0682 1.0034 1.0169 1.0140 1.0680 1.1135 1.0819 
FOOD  0.9420  0.9420  1.0586  1.0706  1.0288  1.0146  0.9902  0.9946  0.9896 0.9922 0.9966 0.9963 0.9927 0.9930 0.9959 0.9949 0.9679 0.9979 
TEXT  0.8939  0.8939  1.3050  1.3684  0.9869  0.9438  0.9169  0.9206  0.9164 0.9185 0.9743 0.9220 0.9295 0.9161 0.9367 0.9196 0.7489 0.9240 
MANF  0.9486  0.9486  1.0316  1.0361  1.0337  1.0281  1.0024  1.0005  1.0018 0.9982 1.0009 1.0025 0.9921 0.9928 1.0010 1.0005 1.0082 1.0035 
PETR  0.9993  0.9993  0.9871  0.9827  1.0148  1.0298  1.0070  1.0047  1.0064 1.0024 1.0026 1.0066 0.9984 1.0022 1.0008 1.0062 1.0239 1.0084 
CHEM  0.9654  0.9654  1.0173  1.0244  1.0298  1.0197  0.9970  0.9961  0.9964 0.9938 0.9990 0.9980 0.9920 0.9917 0.9984 0.9965 0.9903 0.9995 
VEHI  0.9589  0.9589  1.0368  1.0527  1.0432  1.0152  0.9910  0.9789  0.9904 0.9766 0.9966 0.9813 0.9834 0.9701 0.9948 0.9792 0.9704 0.9807 
CONS  1.0000  1.0000  0.9910  0.9949  1.0340  1.0301  1.0000  1.0017  0.9994 0.9994 1.0000 1.0037 0.9995 1.0018 0.9998 1.0021 1.0001 1.0048 
SERV  1.0000  1.0000  0.9869  0.9910  1.0351  1.0251  1.0000  0.9997  0.9994 0.9973 1.0000 1.0017 0.9984 0.9991 0.9998 1.0001 1.0003 1.0028 
 





















The variations in the value added price influence the movement of the wage rates 
and the capital rental rate and these in turn trigger factor reallocations. Wages fall for both 
skilled and unskilled labour in both the short and long run. The fall in wages can be traced 
directly to a fall in labour demand as a result of the contraction in labour demand of the 
labour intensive sectors of services, textiles and chemicals. The expanding mining sector is 
relatively capital intensive, which explains why its capital rate of return increases. As can be 
gleaned from Table 7, both skilled and unskilled labour relocates towards the expanding 
mining sector and to a limited extent towards agriculture, manufacturing and petroleum. 
Capital goods also attract skilled labour both in the short and long run. The declining sectors, 
especially textiles, chemical goods, vehicles and to a minor extent services are generally 
shedding labour.  
Capital stock movements reinforce the effects on output from labour reallocation and 
accumulation. As shown in Table 7, the rate of return on capital initially increases in the short 
run and subsequently declines in the long run for the capital intensive mining, in line with 
value added price developments discussed earlier. There is a pronounced initial decline in 
capital return for textiles as well as the other initially highly protected sectors (food, 
manufacturing and chemicals). The short run volatility in capital returns are to be explained 
by the observation that capital is given and sector specific. However, in the long run the 
rates tend to converge as capital has had sufficient time to reallocate to the most profitable 
sectors (this is why the short run positive return in mining falls in the long run). Relatively 
speaking, we notice that mining has become relatively more profitable than other sectors 
especially in the short run following trade liberalization. 
As shown in Table 7, the consequences of these capital price developments are that 
capital reallocates towards mining and its accumulation is also the highest in this sector. 
Accumulation remains negative both in the short and long run for the now relatively 
unprofitable sectors of food, textiles, chemical and vehicles. The sharpest declines are in 
textiles, especially in the long run following from the massive relative fall in the capital rate of 
return. The resulting impacts on output of these value added price dynamics and factor 
reallocations are that resources will move away from other sectors, especially textiles, 
towards the mining sector. As expected, trade liberalization leads to reductions in domestic 
sales. Looking at sectoral domestic sales development gives us an idea of which sectors are 
driven out of the market by the increased import competition. It turns out that the only winner 
in terms of domestic market capture in the short run is mining. All other sectors experience 
losses in their shares of the domestic market. The worst affected is textiles followed by 
vehicles, chemicals, manufacturing, food and agriculture.   
  4
The intuition behind this result is that the tariff reduction following an across the 
board tariff removal induces a drop of government revenue (these products represent little 
more than 8 percent of indirect tax revenue). Government loss of revenue is compensated 
by an increase of domestic indirect taxes. Food, textiles, vehicles and chemicals show the 
highest domestic tax rates so that the tax increase affects mostly these sectors and 
particularly textiles. There is a drop of these sectors domestic demand, over and above the 
drop induced by increased import pressure. Inter industry flows are then responsible for 
transmitting these negative flows to other sectors with the exception of mining which remains 
insulated as it does not have strong linkages with the rest of the economy. Mining gains 
even more of the domestic market share in the long run, but this time a number of other 
sectors regains their domestic market shares. These are petroleum and capital goods, all of 
them relatively capital intensive sectors. The rest of the sectors suffer losses. The changes 
in domestic market shares are relatively small compared to the changes in exports and 
imports because of the relatively small initial import intensities as well as the imperfect 
substitution between local and imported sales which both have the tendency to limit further 
import substitution of domestic production.  
The changes in domestic sales have an impact on domestic prices and consequently 
gross supply. Table 7 shows that output goes up dramatically in mining both in the short and 
long run, driven by the surge in exports from the real exchange rate depreciation which is 
further reinforced by the positive domestic sales effect. There are also very minor gains for 
agriculture, manufacturing and petroleum in the short run as a result of cheaper inputs as 
well as positive export incentives. In the long run, mining receives the highest expansion in 
gross supply while petroleum, manufacturing, capital goods and services also continue to 
experience positive supply responses. The remaining sectors experience declining fortunes, 
with the most severely affected being textiles, followed by vehicles, food and chemicals. 
As would be expected from the movements in capital rates of return and capital 
accumulation discussed above as well as the observation that falling import prices also 
reduce the cost of imported investment, Table 7 shows that investment by destination goes 
up both in the short run and the long run for mining, agriculture, manufacturing, petroleum 
and capital goods. The biggest increases are in the mining sector. Services experiences 
increases in investment only in the long run. The main reason for this is that relatively 
speaking, the average return to capital relative to the user cost of capital goes up in these 
sectors. There is a pronounced fall in the short run for textiles, followed by gradual declines 
in food, chemicals, food and vehicles as the average return to capital relative to the user cost 
of capital falls in the short run relative to other sectors. However, investment by destination 
falls by less in these sectors due to a relative cheapening over time in these goods.  
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Welfare effects 
Because factor prices are the main drivers of household income, we would generally 
expect household incomes to fall, with the fall determined by initial factor shares. Household 
income falls both in the short and long run following full trade liberalization for all 
households. However, rural skilled households tend to experience smaller declines in 
income than other groups. This is because they depend disproportionately less on 
employment in the declining textiles sector. Total real household consumption follows the 
same trend as household incomes, declining for all households both in the short and long 
run. As shown in Figure 7, welfare as measured by the dynamic equivalent variation falls for 
most households in the short run because income declines more than the consumer price 
index for most households. Rural African households and Urban Coloured Unskilled 
households experience positive welfare effects in the short run as their income fall by less 
than the fall in the consumer price index. In the long run, with the exception of skilled White 
households, changes in income and consumer price index move in such a way that 
households experience welfare increases. Coloured and African unskilled households are 
the main beneficiaries, irrespective of their regional location. 








































The impact of trade liberalization on poverty is captured by changes in the poverty 
indices reported in the last column of Table 8. The changes in poverty are largely in line with 
the changes in welfare. This is because the changes are largely driven by changes in the 
consumer price index and changes in household income or consumption. The impacts on  
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poverty are very small. Using the percent change in average headcount index of poverty 
measure, the results in Table 8 suggest that a unilateral removal of tariffs has a very small 
but negative impact on poverty headcount. The burden of these negative impacts is shared 
almost evenly between urban and rural households. Indian unskilled households, in 
particular rural Indian households, shoulder a disproportionate amount of the poverty 
burden. This is largely because of their higher dependence on employment in textiles, the 
sector that faced the highest protection before the trade policy intervention. The average 
poverty gap and the squared poverty gap also follow a similar pattern.  
Table 8: Impact of trade liberalization on poverty (in percent of BAU) 
   Short Run =2009  Long Run =2020 
   P0  P1  P2  P0 P1 P2 
South Africa  0  0.55 0.83 -0.19 -2.15 -2.65 
Residential Area 
Urban  0.0014 0.17 0.29 -0.01 -1.58 -1.98 
Rural 0.0013  0.2  0.38  -0.52 -4.41 -4.65 
Ethnic group 
African household  0.009  0.12 0.19  -1.1  -1.3 -1.66 
Coloured  household  0.001 0.25 0.26  -5.2 -5.54  -6.1 
Indian household  0.026  0.19 0.43  -0.6 -1.82 -1.97 
White  household  0.01 0.15 0.33  0  0  0 
Region, Ethnic and skill group 
Urban African Skilled  0  0  0          
Urban Coloured Skilled  0  0  0          
Urban Indian Skilled  0  0  0          
Urban White Skilled  0  0  0          
Urban African Unskilled  0.007  0.22 0.45 -1.43 -1.44 -1.78 
Urban Coloured Unskilled  0.001 0.54 0.84 -1.27 -2.35 -2.98 
Urban Indian Unskilled  0.03  0.55 0.65  -0.2 -0.67 -0.85 
Urban White Unskilled  0  0  0          
Rural African Skilled  0  0  0          
Rural Coloured Skilled  0  0  0          
Rural Indian Skilled  0  0  0          
Rural White Skilled  0  0  0          
Rural African Unskilled  0  0  0  -1.34  -3.59  -3.92 
Rural Coloured Unskilled  0  0  0  -1.4  -6.22  -7.05 
Rural Indian Unskilled  0.0031  0.72  0.78  0  0  0 
Rural White Unskilled  0.006  0  0  0  0  0 
The picture reverses in the long run, with the incidence of poverty declining for the 
whole country by about 0.19 percent, which is still quite small. The reduction in poverty is as 
a result of the static and dynamic efficiency gains from trade liberalization as well as 
accumulation effects. The main beneficiaries of reduced poverty are Coloured households, 
followed by African households. Both supply a higher proportion of their labour endowment 
to the mining sector and other tradeable sectors. They also consume disproportionately 
more foodstuffs whose cost has been reduced by trade liberalization. Indian households also 
experience reductions in poverty, but by a relatively smaller margin. Rural households 
benefit more than urban households, given their higher dependence on the booming mining 
sector.  
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4.2  Unilateral trade liberalization with TFP increases 
As argued above, the impacts of trade liberalization on the economy have tended to 
be very small, even after allowing for dynamic effects emanating from factor accumulations 
through time. One rationalization used for this result was that the country has already reaped 
the gains from trade given that the country has undergone substantial trade liberalization 
since 1994. In line with modern trade literature, we wish to explore in this section whether 
dynamic trade induced TFP changes may lead to “bigger numbers” from trade liberalization.  
Macroeconomic effects 
According to Table 9, removing all tariffs under the assumption of trade induced TFP 
increases has very pronounced and beneficial effects compared to trade liberalization 
without productivity gains. We see that factoring TFP gains will raise GDP from about 1 
percent in 2009 to over 6 percent in 2020. This in turn will positively impact on incomes, 
which in turn raises savings and consequently investment. Private consumption rises sharply 
compared to the no TFP change scenario. The increase in GDP feeds into increased 
consumption both in the short and long run. The capital good price rises in the short run 
before falling in the long run. However, because of TFP increases, the user cost of capital 
falls from 2009 until 2020. Because of the rising rental to user cost of capital ratio couple 
with the higher induced savings, there is a boom in investment by destination, with the long 
run response being stronger than the short run response. Imports increase dramatically not 
only due to the cost reducing effects of tariff cuts but also because TFP induced growing 
economy requires a higher level of imports to meet higher production levels and increased 
household demands. Indeed imports rise much faster than exports in the short run, in part 
due to an induced real exchange rate appreciation. In the long run, exports grow more than 
imports. The consumer price index increases initially in the short run before declining in the 
long run. Skilled and unskilled wages increase in both periods following increased demand 
for labour to meet higher growth needs. Welfare rises dramatically in line with the observed 
consumer price index and consumption developments. Finally, trade induced TFP increases 
and accumulation effects lead to reductions in poverty, both in the short and long run.   
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Table 9: Macroeconomic effects of a unilateral trade liberalization and TFP 








































































































































2008  -0.06 8.52 17.50 3.36 10.32 7.87 8.65 0.35 12.94  1.27
2009 0.91 9.34 18.86 4.63 11.03 9.41 9.98 0.15 7.93  -0.93
2010 1.88  10.29 18.96 6.14 11.62 10.94 11.48 -0.17 5.60  -1.87
2011 2.76  11.17 18.57 7.63 12.07 12.31 12.85 -0.50 3.93  -2.43
2012 3.53  11.93 17.99 9.00 12.40 13.49 14.06 -0.79 2.55  -2.79
2013  4.18 12.58 17.36 10.22 12.66 14.49 15.09 -1.02 1.37  -3.03
2014  4.72 13.12 16.74 11.26 12.85 15.32 15.94 -1.20 0.38  -3.18
2015  5.16 13.55 16.16 12.14 12.98 16.00 16.64 -1.34 -0.44 -3.28
2016  5.51 13.90 15.63 12.87 13.08 16.53 17.19 -1.44 -1.11 -3.33
2017  5.78 14.17 15.15 13.46 13.15 16.94 17.61 -1.51 -1.66 -3.36
2018  5.99 14.37 14.72 13.93 13.18 17.24 17.93 -1.56 -2.09 -3.37
2019  6.15 14.51 14.34 14.30 13.20 17.46 18.16 -1.59 -2.43 -3.36
2020  6.26 14.60 14.00 14.58 13.19 17.61 18.31 -1.60 -2.70 -3.34
Sectoral effects 
Obviously the fall in import prices as a result of tariff removal with TFP increases will 
not differ from that induced by tariff removal in the absence of induced TFP increases. 
However, the overall impact on import levels will differ because of the increase in import 
demand induced by TFP growth. Thus, from Table 10 we notice that imports are higher in 
the trade induced TFP increase tariff reduction scenario than the same scenario without 
productivity gains. The sectoral distribution of these TFP induced higher imports is similar to 
the case without TFP increases and driven by changes in import prices as before.  
The trade induced TFP increase results in an increase in exports in all sectors both in 
the short and long run (see Table 10) which is higher than when there was no trade induced 
TFP increases. While mining was responsible for most of the export growth in the previous 
scenarios, export growth is now driven by vehicles, manufacturing and food. This is because 
they have larger linkages with the domestic economy which is growing than the mining 
sector has, hence they benefit more from a growing economy. 3 
Table 10: Sectoral effects of unilateral trade liberalization with TFP growth (BAU =1) 


































AGRI  1.0699 1.0998 1.0063 1.2039  1.0126 1.0291  1.0061 1.0236  1.0190  1.1508  1.0348  1.1378  1.0322 1.1438  1.1757 1.1680 
MINI  1.0180 1.0875 1.0153 1.0890  0.9747 0.9990  0.9684 0.9937  1.0033  1.1093  1.0172  1.0879  1.0158 1.0886  1.0350 1.1523 
FOOD  1.1825 1.2201 1.0397 1.2609  1.0799 1.0767  1.0729 1.0709  1.0487  1.2035  1.0617  1.1751  1.0598 1.1828  1.4579 1.2239 
TEXT  1.4330 1.5762 1.0409 1.1008  0.9658 1.0125  0.9596 1.0071  1.0004  1.1306  0.9934  1.0641  0.9993 1.0688  1.0039 1.1525 
MANF  1.1212 1.1345 1.0528 1.1624  1.0467 1.0276  1.0399 1.0222  1.0360  1.1535  1.0522  1.1003  1.0523 1.1140  1.3137 1.1566 
PETR  1.0333 1.0492 1.0302 1.2114  1.0124 0.9947  1.0059 0.9894  1.0195  1.1134  1.0313  1.1159  1.0311 1.1300  1.1776 1.1282 
CHEM  1.0538 1.1198 1.0572 1.1831  1.0022 1.0337  0.9958 1.0282  1.0146  1.1558  1.0236  1.1124  1.0293 1.1245  1.1385 1.1758 
VEHI  1.1384 1.1038 1.1146 1.2931  1.0786 1.0980  1.0717 1.0921  1.0519  1.2308  1.0599  1.1611  1.0703 1.1880  1.4532 1.2403 
CONS  1.1083 1.1019 0.9594 1.1667  1.1152 1.0140  1.1080 1.0086  1.0771  1.1427  1.0768  1.1145  1.0757 1.1151  1.6234 1.1312 
SERV  1.0310 1.0880 0.9938 1.0555  0.9851 0.9903  0.9787 0.9850  1.0078  1.1081  1.0218  1.0800  1.0208 1.0791  1.0747 1.1239 
 
While the only sector that gained in terms of domestic sales in the tariff reduction scenario without TFP increases was mining, we notice 
from Table 9 that all sectors now experience increased domestic demand in the trade liberalization induced TFP gain scenario induced by 
higher growth in the long run. Viewed from the context of the earlier scenario, the sector that gains the most is textiles. This is because textiles 
has the highest initial factor scale parameter associated with it.  
The effect on gross supply follows a similar trend as the outcome in domestic demand that has just been discussed (see Table 10). All 
sectors benefit from trade induced TFP increases. Sectors such as Food, Vehicles, Construction and Agriculture with higher scale parameters 
gain the most. Services benefits from the high growth scenario because its output is an important input for most of the sectors which are 
experiencing gains. Mining, the sector that benefited the most in the case without trade induced TFP growth does not benefit as much, although 
it still experiences positive impacts. This is because of a lower factor scale parameter associated with its production functions as well as lower 
linkages with the rest of the economy. 3 
On the factor markets, wages increase for both skilled and unskilled workers in the 
short and long run in response to increased labour demand as a result of the expanding 
economy (Table 10). Unskilled wage rates rise slightly more than skilled wage rates. Labour 
is now being drawn from mining sectors towards the other sectors, a complete reversal of 
what was observed in the scenario with no trade induced TFP increases. Overall, 
employment increases for all skill categories although skilled labour experiences marginally 
higher growth.  
Together with increases in value added prices and wage rates, the return on capital 
increases for all sectors in the short run in all the sectors and subsequently declines for all 
sectors in the long run (Figure 8). However, the decline in the long run is relatively less than 
the decline in the user cost of capital. As a result, investment by origin increases in both the 
short and long run following a trade induced TFP increase (Table 10).  
































Due to higher induced savings and the movements in capital rates of return and 
capital accumulation discussed above, trade induced TFP growth increases investment by 
destination for all sectors (Table 10). The increases are higher in the short run than in the 
long run. Construction receives the highest positive stimulus to investment in the short run 
while in the long run capital accumulation is more evenly spread. Compared to the no TFP 
change trade liberalization scenario, we notice several important differences. The sharp 
short run decline in textiles investment observed in the no TFP increase scenario is now 
absent while the Mining sector has moved from being the sector that benefits the most from  
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investment to one that receives the least gains. In the long run, investment has gone up 
roughly by an average of 14 percent for each sector compared to the business as usual path 
whereas it only went up by a mere 0.75 percent in the no TFP increase trade liberalization 
scenario.  
Welfare effects 
We have observed that a main consequence of trade induced TFP growth is the 
increase in factor prices. Given that factor prices are the main driving force behind 
household income, it is not surprising that the trade induced TFP intervention results in all 
household incomes increasing. The gain is higher in the long run compared to the short run 
and much higher than was the case in the no TFP increase trade liberalization scenario. 
African, Indian and Coloured Unskilled households reap most of the benefits while Rural 
White households benefit the list
10.  
The increase in household income is higher than the increase in consumer price 
index in the short run so that real consumption and welfare increases for all households 
(Figure 9). In the long run, the falling consumer price index reinforces the income effects so 
that the equivalent variation goes up by even more for all households. Total household 
consumption follows the same trend as household incomes, increasing for all households 
both in the short run and in the long run. Unskilled households gain more than skilled 
households while rural households stand to gain more than urban households. 


























Trade induced TFP increase has a more significant impact on poverty reduction than 
trade liberalization without induced TFP growth as shown in Table 11. The poverty 
headcount ratio falls by 0.54 percent in the short run and by 5.34 percent in the long run. 
Most of the poverty reduction is felt amongst African and Coloured households while urban 
households benefit less than their rural counterparts from the ensuing fall in poverty. Once 
again the average poverty gap and the squared poverty gap also follow a similar pattern to 
the headcount ratio.  
Table 11: Impact of trade liberalization on poverty (in percent of BAU) 
   Short Run =2009  Long Run =2020 
   P0 P1 P2 P0 P1 P2 
South Africa  -0.54 -0.20 -1.30 -5.34 -4.30 -7.78
Residential Area 
Urban -0.33 -0.15 -1.67 -5.22 -5.16  -6.45
Rural -0.56 -0.46 -1.34 -7.46 -6.60  -8.30
Ethnic group 
African household  -1.15 -1.30 -2.20 -6.44 -5.42  -7.70
Coloured household  -1.31 -0.78 -1.80 -7.92 -7.20  -8.20
Indian household  -0.50 -0.10 -1.45 -5.77 -4.32  -7.20
White household  -0.21 -0.10 -1.78 -4.25 -3.21  -5.40
Region, Ethnic and skill group 
Urban African Skilled  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
Urban Coloured Skilled  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
Urban Indian Skilled  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
Urban White Skilled  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
Urban African Unskilled  -0.70 -0.40 -1.45 -9.36 -11.40 -12.30
Urban Coloured Unskilled  -1.20 -0.54 -1.84 -9.90 -12.80  -16.60
Urban Indian Unskilled  -0.12 -0.55 -1.65 -2.30 -3.80  -5.60
Urban White Unskilled  -0.13 -1.62 -1.92 -1.34 -3.30  -8.80
Rural African Skilled  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
Rural Coloured Skilled  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
Rural Indian Skilled  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
Rural White Skilled  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
Rural African Unskilled  -1.40 -1.30 -1.93 -10.52 -9.98  -11.20
Rural Coloured Unskilled  -1.86 -2.30 -2.23 -10.91 -8.87  -12.15
Rural Indian Unskilled  -0.87 -0.72 -1.78 -4.19 -2.40  -6.40
Rural White Unskilled  -0.67 -0.57 -1.83 -3.23 -3.2  -5.6
5.  Summary and conclusion 
South Africa has undergone significant trade liberalization since the end of apartheid. 
Average protection has fallen while openness has increased. The macroeconomic 
performance in this era of liberalizing trade has been unimpressive, with GDP growing by 
insufficient amounts to make inroads into the high unemployment levels. Poverty levels have 
also risen. This paper examines the impact of unilateral trade policy reforms on the economy 
with and without trade induced TFP increases. The study advances existing CGE work in  
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South Africa in at least two ways. Firstly, it uses a top down approach based on the 2000 
household survey to model explicitly poverty effects of policy. Secondly, it employs a 
sequential dynamic CGE model to carry out the sequential “top down” poverty micro 
simulation. 
Trade liberalization alone has very minimal short run macroeconomic consequences. 
The outcome for the long run macroeconomic developments is positive for tariff removal 
although the magnitude of the impacts is still very small. The sectoral results indicate that 
sectors which initially faced high protection levels tend to be the ones to lose out 
disproportionately more from trade liberalization. The biggest winner is Mining while the 
biggest loser is Textiles. The picture reverses when we allow for trade induced TFP 
increases, with bigger and positive impacts on the macroeconomy. Mining is no longer the 
main beneficiary of the reform. 
The welfare outcomes are initially negative in the short run but turn positive if we 
allow for trade induced TFP increases. The welfare gains are positive in the long term in all 
scenarios. Although all households benefit in the long run, African and Coloured poor 
households in general and especially those residing in rural areas reap the most benefits. 
Trade liberalization policy has been found to be progressive – highest gains accrue to the 
poorest groups – despite the low level of tariff protection remaining in South Africa.  
In terms of poverty, trade liberalization has no appreciable impact on poverty in the 
short run even if we allow for trade induced TFP increases. However, in the long run poverty 
reduces even in the case when we do not allow for TFP increases. Again, African and 
Coloured households gain the most in the long run in terms of numbers being pulled out of 
absolute poverty, especially if the trade measure were to induce TFP increases.  
Some useful policy conclusions emerge from these results. Without exception, there 
is still substantial scope to lower prices and raise household welfare through stronger 
unilateral tariff liberalization. However, there is an asymmetry in the timing of the welfare 
gains that can only be picked by dynamic analysis. If trade liberalization induces TFP 
increases, the gains are magnified. These results point to a future role for trade policy in 
South Africa. They suggest that short-term temporary measures such as transfers to poor 
households may be justified to ameliorate the transitory negative effects on the poor before 
the long-term gains are realized. They also suggest that measures should be put in place so 
as to increase the chances that future tariff cuts generate substantial TFP growth. Such 
measures could include training programs. 
When interpreting and using these results, it is important to be aware of a number of 
limitations inherent in the approach that is used which remain areas for future research.  
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First, it is important to understand the consequences of hypothesis used in updating capital, 
labour and minimum consumption and how that complicates distributional outcomes. For 
instance, saving/investment behaviours may not be identical for all households and this will 
have strong income distribution and welfare impacts in subsequent years. A related limitation 
of the model used is that it does not make a distinction between the growth rate in skilled 
and unskilled labor, which may be unrealistic in an economy displaying high unskilled labour 
unemployment. The assumption used of identical population growth for all households needs 
to be interrogated further as this will impact on their consumption and saving behaviour as 
the minimum consumption is updated. Government expenditure will also need to be adjusted 
according to the increase of public services and investment demand from the growing 
population. Finally, analysis of growth and distribution effects on poverty will be another 
fruitful area for further research.  
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